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ABSTRACT 
 By analysing the 2014 Law Commission’s Report, this paper considers the possible reform 
of matrimonial property agreements, focusing on the difficulties of achieving a balance 
between the autonomy of the parties and the protection of the ‘vulnerable’ spouse. It 
identifies a key limitation of the Report as being a lack of clarity regarding the concept of 
‘needs’, as ‘needs’ are used as a safety net against binding matrimonial property agreements. 
It suggests examining the solutions adopted in French law and their possible applicability in 
England and Wales. It argues that binding matrimonial property agreements should have an 
impact on the definition of fairness. 
Key words: matrimonial property agreements, needs, fairness, autonomy, French law, 
divorce, maintenance, judge’s discretionary powers. 
INTRODUCTION 
Matrimonial property agreements are contracts entered into by couples in order to govern 
their financial arrangements if their relationship ends. These agreements are not binding in 
England and Wales but the Law Commission has recommended that they should be, as they 
provide ‘an important source of legal certainty for high net worth couples’ and permit couples 
entering into a second union to protect their children from previous relationships.
1
 However, 
this proposal includes an important exception; it would be possible for a judge to set aside or 
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modify the agreement when the ‘needs’ of one of the spouses so require,
2
 to guarantee that it 
cannot cause any ‘unforeseen hardship’.
3
 
This safeguard aims to achieve ‘fairness’ and is inspired by the current rules that perceive it 
to be essential to protect any spouse against the economic disadvantage created by divorce. 
The rationale for this is two-fold: first, one of the primary functions of family law is to 
protect the ‘weaker’ spouse; second, the spouse in greater financial need should be 
maintained by his or her ex-spouse rather than being dependent on state support.
4
 As the law 
does not distinguish between maintenance or property, the courts’ discretion as to how needs 
should be met is not limited to the protection of the spouses’ basic income needs, but 
encompasses the distribution of their assets. Courts have, therefore,
 
important redistributive 
powers in order to ensure the protection of the ‘economically weaker spouse’.
5
 As ‘there is no 
definition of “needs” in English law,’ and as the Law Commission has not defined it either,
6
 
this means that even if the Law Commission’s recommendations are followed, judges would 
retain extensive powers over matrimonial property agreements. 
This article argues that this is problematic, as the presence of a matrimonial property 
agreement should influence the definition of fairness. The Law Commission itself 
acknowledges the complexity of the concept of ‘fairness’ and underlines that outcomes 
agreed by the parties might be considered as fairer than those imposed on them by the courts, 
especially as the ‘Court system cannot provide tailor-made justice for all’.
7
 Yet giving 
important discretionary powers to the judge despite a matrimonial property agreement creates 
uncertainty and the potential to override the wishes of the parties. It limits autonomy in a 
context where fairness should take into account the individuals’ views. In divorce law cases, 
the courts define marriage as a contract or as a partnership, which are both based on 
autonomy. As marriage itself stands on autonomy, the non-recognition of matrimonial 
property agreements seems to create a ‘remarkable anomaly’ as it limits the spouse’s ability 
to ‘make their own agreements’ while this right is not restricted in the same way for 
unmarried cohabitants.
8
  
Academic reflection on whether to grant spouses far-reaching autonomy through binding 
matrimonial property agreements is therefore timely. This article opts for a comparative 
approach, suggesting alternative ways in which English law could solve the socio-legal 
problem of ‘autonomy’ of the spouses and protection of the ‘vulnerable’ ex-spouse in the 
context of divorce. It analyses the solutions in France, which recognises binding matrimonial 
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property agreements and thus provides an example of a legal system where fairness is defined 
distinctively by giving autonomy a much more predominant position and by addressing 
differently the imbalance between ex-spouses. It argues that instead of using the concept of 
‘needs’ as an exception to ‘binding’ matrimonial property agreements (as proposed by the 
Law Commission), a clear distinction needs to be made between two issues in divorce: the 
‘distribution of assets’, and ‘financial relief’ or ‘maintenance’. Building on previous analyses 
of this distinction,
9
 it moves the discussion forward by proposing to take into account the way 
in which French law limits the judge’s intervention; the judge can only take decisions related 
to financial support and cannot redistribute assets between the spouses. This article provides 
an in-depth analysis of the practical consequences of this distinction and argues that lessons 
drawn from it could contribute to the clarification of ‘needs’ in England and Wales. In 
particular, the distinction between ‘maintenance’ and ‘property’ should not be limited to 
cases including foreign elements but should be extended to pure English divorce cases.  
However, it is important to acknowledge that there are differences between the social, 
cultural and legal environments of these two countries. First, in France, financial relief is 
generally based on fixed rules, while in England and Wales, it is based on the judge’s 
discretion. Second, in English law, providing a roof to the ex-spouse is crucial,
10
 which is not 
the case in France as the housing market and the social welfare system will make the 
rehousing of the ex-spouse easier. This means that ‘needs’ cannot be calculated similarly in 
both countries and any comparisons have to be made cautiously.
11
  
This article starts by briefly introducing the English system of financial relief upon divorce 
and its consequences for matrimonial property agreements. It then analyses the Law 
Commission’s proposals before exploring how the French system tries to achieve a balance 
between autonomy of the parties and protection of the ‘vulnerable’ spouse at the time of 
entering into the matrimonial property agreement and at the time of the divorce. Based on 
French law, the final section proposes a reconsideration of the definition of ‘fairness’ in the 
context of matrimonial property agreements in England and Wales, thereby making a timely 
contribution to the current discussion of law reform in this area, as well as to the broader 
debate on how best to achieve a balance between autonomy and protection of the weaker 
spouse in the context of divorce.  
 
The judge’s intervention in England and Wales 
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The key role played by the judge in divorce settlements in England and Wales explains the 
current approach to matrimonial property agreements. As there is no distinction between the 
distribution of assets and the maintenance of the ex-spouse, judges have important 
discretionary powers in both of these aspects, aimed at protecting the weaker spouse.  
In 1882, the Married Women’s Property Act introduced a rigid separation of property 
between spouses but offered only a very restricted protection to the financially weaker party 
in the event of a divorce. Later, following the introduction of the non-fault divorce under the 
Divorce Reform Law 1969, the relief of hardship caused by divorce became essential as far 
fewer married women worked than today.
12
 There were pressures for the introduction of a 
community of property regime,
13
 under which property accumulated by both spouses during 
their marriage becomes joint property, even if it was originally acquired in the name of one of 
them only.
14
 However, this proposition was rejected several times because most wanted the 
courts to have discretionary powers to reallocate property on divorce or on death.
15
 The lack 
of discretionary powers would have produced ‘unintended results in that important needs are 
remaining unsatisfied’.
16
 Consequently, the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 chose to protect 
the ‘economically weaker’ spouse by giving considerable powers to courts when deciding 
upon financial provisions and property adjustments.
17
  
Since 1973, the courts have adopted a ‘fairness’ approach, which is inherently subjective.
18
 
Originally, ‘fairness’ was equivalent to a ‘reasonable requirements’ approach, based on the 
financial needs of the spouse and where the ‘needs’ represented only a very small percentage 
of the other spouse’s wealth.
19
 Gradually, this was replaced by a more generous approach. 
White v White
20
 regarded contributions made by way of home-making or childcare as equal to 
contributions made as a result of monetary work and advocated a ‘yardstick of equality’. This 
‘yardstick’ meant that judges had to check their decision against equality of assets, whereas 
the Court of Appeal later considered equality not only as a ‘yardstick’ but also as the starting 
point.
21
 Miller; McFarlane
22
 continued the move toward the acceptance of equal sharing and 
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identified three strands of financial provision: needs, compensation and sharing. A 
relationship generates ‘needs’ that the other party should meet; ‘compensation’ aims to 
redress any significant prospective disparity between the parties arising from the way they 
conducted their marriage;
 
whilst ‘sharing’ refers to marriage as ‘a partnership of equals’,
23
 
where both individuals are perceived as working together for common benefits. Upon 
divorce, redistribution of assets between the spouses is permitted as a financial remedy. 
These strands were considered as general principles that aimed to limit the judicial discretion 
in the future. However, the judges do not necessarily explain what proportion of the financial 
relief they have chosen falls under any of these three ‘categories’. A consequence is that there 
is no distinction between ‘maintenance’ and ‘the distribution of assets’. Even if maintenance 
might be defined as ‘the provision of food, clothing, and other basic necessities of life’
24
 
resulting from the spouses’ mutual duty of support, financial relief also includes the 
distribution of all the assets belonging to the spouses regardless of their origin. This 
reallocation of assets is perceived as a means to guarantee the standard of living and equality 
between the spouses.
25
  
The concept of fairness used in this context is not based on the parties determining what they 
regard as fair. It rather delegates to the courts the power to oversee what is fair in each 
individual case. For a long time, therefore, the autonomy of the parties was restricted, as it 
could have limited the court’s powers. Matrimonial property agreements were regarded with 
suspicion and were unenforceable for two reasons. First, any matrimonial property agreement 
was in contradiction with the duty of a husband and a wife to live together as it anticipated a 
future divorce.
26
 Not only could a person not contract out of their responsibility to a child
27
 
but matrimonial property agreements were perceived as encouraging separation and 
divorce.
28
 Second, any attempt to exclude the powers of the courts to grant financial relief 
was considered as void on the grounds of public policy.
29
 The wide powers granted to judges 
permitted fairness in divorce. Fairness did not mean treating spouses as contracting parties 
and respecting their autonomy but rather meant ensuring an equitable decision according to 
the parties’ respective situations. Therefore, English law considered that financial remedies in 
divorce rely on discretion being broadly afforded to the divorce court, which was difficult to 
combine with binding matrimonial property agreements.  
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There are several reasons justifying this rule. First, it ensures that spouses cannot pass their 
responsibility to support their former spouse on to the State.
30
 Second, according to the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, financial remedies aim to achieve a fair outcome for each 
individual case, requiring ‘tailor-made’ orders made by the court.
31
 However, the 
development of a settlement approach when dealing with the financial consequences of 
divorce has eroded these two rules.
32
 Agreements concluded after divorce, ie ‘separation 
agreements’ have been encouraged, and gradually the courts have come to view matrimonial 
property agreements as an increasingly significant factor, one to be considered as part of their 
wide discretion exercised within section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.
33
 In this 
context, the Supreme Court took a major decision in the direction of the recognition of 
matrimonial property agreements.  
Radmacher (formerly Granatino) v Granatino
34
 involved a wealthy German woman 
divorcing a French man. Prior to their marriage, the parties signed an agreement in Germany 
separating their assets and barring either party from applying for maintenance. The husband 
later gave up his banker’s career for a lower paid position, and by the time of the divorce, the 
wife was much more financially secure than he was. The Supreme Court had to determine the 
impact of the matrimonial property agreement within English law and held that the common 
law rule considering matrimonial agreements as being against public policy as anticipating a 
future divorce was ‘obsolete and should be swept away’.
35
 As the duty upon husband and 
wife to live together was no longer enforceable, the reasoning that led to the rule had 
disappeared.
36
  
In addition, the Supreme Court insisted on the importance of the parties’ autonomy: ‘the 
court should give effect to a nuptial agreement that is freely entered into by each party with a 
full appreciation of its implications unless in the circumstances prevailing it would not be fair 
to hold the parties to their agreement’.
37
 A matrimonial property agreement could be 
enforced, although it would be subject to any application to the court under the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1973, as no matrimonial court can be ‘bound’ by such an agreement according to 
the Hyman principle.
38
 While before Radmacher the agreement was only one of the factors of 
section 25 that the court had to take into account, Radmacher created a ‘rebuttable 
presumption’ under which, once it is shown the parties freely entered into the agreement, 
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such agreement should be enforced unless one of the parties can prove that it would be unfair 
to give effect to it.
39
  
However, Lady Hale gave a strong dissenting judgment, observing that such a presumption 
would undermine the vision of marriage as a status, as couples would be able to contract out 
of the mutual duty of support created by marriage
 
and highlighting the risk of gender 
discrimination against women.
40
 Several academics shared this view,
41
 which will be 
considered further in the next section.  
Others welcomed Radmacher as a ‘clear, fair and certain decision’,
42
 in line with 
developments in other European countries.
43
 And indeed, following Radmacher, the Law 
Commission proposed the introduction of ‘qualifying’ matrimonial property agreements.
44
 
These would enable spouses to make contractual arrangements about the financial 
consequences of their divorce. Certain procedural safeguards would have to be met and these 
agreements could not be used to contract out of meeting ‘financial needs’. Drawing upon two 
public consultations, upon research into the law in England and Wales, and into other 
jurisdictions (especially Canada), the Law Commission issued its report after long debates on 
the need for greater certainty and capacity for private ordering. At least three factors can 
explain the proposal to create ‘binding’ matrimonial property agreements.  
The first reason is the increasing number of international divorces, eg divorces involving a 
foreign element such as divorces between parties of different nationalities or divorces where 
an agreement was drawn up in one country but examined by a judge of another one. In 2007, 
in the 27 EU Member states, 13 per cent of divorces had an ‘international element’.
45
 The 
lack of harmonisation of substantive family law and a corresponding lack of harmonisation of 
conflicts of laws’ rules give rise to various disputes relating to property rights. When the 
European Commission took various steps to unify private international law rules in the area 
of matrimonial property regimes,
46
 with a view to preventing forum shopping, the British 
government decided not to opt into these proposals. This decision reveals England and 
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Wales’ preference for the discretionary power of the judge in divorce proceedings.
47
 This 
isolated position is questionable. Other European countries recognise matrimonial property 
agreements as enforceable, and the non-recognition of these agreements in England and 
Wales could be problematic in international cases.
48
 ‘How could the respondent accept as fair 
a London order that he transfer or pay over a substantial proportion of his hard earned fortune 
knowing that in his homeland, his liability would have been minimal?’
49
 It is then possible to 
argue that it is necessary to recognise matrimonial property agreements at least in 
international cases.
50
 
The second reason for creating binding matrimonial property agreements is that they could 
protect non-matrimonial assets.
51
 Currently, even when an agreement has been concluded, 
there is no clear distinction between the various categories of assets owned by the spouses.
 52 
Precluding the sharing of non-matrimonial property on divorce might enable individuals to 
protect ‘special property’, eg family businesses, property acquired in a previous marriage or a 
previous relationship, or inherited or gifted property. Signing a matrimonial property 
agreement is a way to protect ‘earned’ wealth or family assets
53
 and is especially relevant for 
mature couples entering into a second marriage and wishing to regulate the distribution of 
their property if the marriage fails in order, for example, to protect any children born from a 
previous relationship.
54
 This suggests a shift in the reality of marital relationships and the 
interests of the parties, and that matrimonial property agreements can avoid unnecessary 
conflict in the event of a divorce.
55
 
A third reason for making matrimonial property agreements binding is that English law 
allows spouses to freely dispose of their assets via various mechanisms such as trusts or gifts. 
‘Outside the matrimonial context, no court can modify the outcomes dictated by the laws of 
property and express trust, and spouses have to make do with the consequences’.
56
 For 
instance, if one of the spouses decides to give all their assets to a third party during the 
marriage, the other spouse cannot intervene against this decision. This is especially notable 
as, by contrast, France erects important barriers to limit gifts to third parties in order to 
protect qualified relatives via a ‘legal share’ (‘réserve héréditaire’). As such, the surviving 
spouse always has a temporary right to stay in the matrimonial home and sometimes a 
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permanent right in the matrimonial home,
57
 and children automatically receive a share of the 
inheritance.
58
 In France, a key principle is to ensure that property stays within the family. 
English family law usually offers a greater freedom as to whom property can be given. The 
solutions prevailing for matrimonial property agreements can thus be perceived as exceptions 
to this rule. The coherence of the property system will then justify making matrimonial 
property agreements binding. 
The first two reasons outlined above influenced the Law Commission when they were 
considering a possible reform of matrimonial property agreement.
59
 According to their 
Report, binding agreements require some formalities, among which are: the agreement has to 
be made by deed;
 
both parties have to disclose the value of their properties; and each party 
must receive advice from a qualified lawyer.
60
 The aim is to ensure that both parties enter 
freely into the contract and that each clearly understands its consequences. In addition, if all 
of the conditions have been fulfilled, an important exception remains: where the agreement 
does not meet the needs of a party or the interests of a child of the family, the court would not 
only be able to make orders inconsistent with the agreement but would also be able to alter 
them.
61
 These propositions are discussed further in the following section.  
Fairness in matrimonial property agreements: a balance between autonomy and 
protection of the vulnerable party 
By proposing the introduction of qualifying matrimonial property agreements, the Law 
Commission aims to obtain ‘the best balance between enabling parties to achieve autonomy 
and certainty without removing protection of the vulnerable’.
62
 To do so, the judge shall be 
able to alter these agreements and make financial orders when necessary to meet the ‘needs’ 
of the parties. In other words, the Law Commission provided a safety net by opting to protect 
‘fairness’ via the recognition of ‘needs’. However, ‘needs’ is difficult to define and, as such, 
the Law Commission’s proposals limit the significance given to autonomy. This section 
examines the concept of autonomy and then argues that a particular definition of ‘needs’ 
should be used if there is a matrimonial property agreement. 
According to Alison Diduck, autonomy in family law takes two forms.  ‘Autonomy of the 
individual’ consists of encouraging people to make decision about their relationships. 
‘Autonomy of process’ is the creation of an autonomous system of dispute resolution. In the 
context of matrimonial property agreements, it gives to spouses the ability to choose by 
themselves the consequences of their divorce.
63
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Regarding ‘autonomy of the individual’, Diduck expresses two main concerns. First, in 
family law, the ‘autonomous individual’ is opposed to the ‘dependent individual’, now recast 
as being ‘vulnerable’.
64
 As the ‘vulnerable category’ is narrower than the ‘dependent 
category’, this may reduce the protection offered by the court to the ‘primary caretakers’.
65
 
Second, the ‘autonomy/vulnerability dichotomy is gendered (…) the vulnerable side of the 
dichotomy is marked as feminine and the autonomous side as masculine’.
66
 This new 
language ‘dramatically reduces the role of the court from protector of basic principles of 
fairness, to protector only of a gendered form of autonomy’.
67
 In the context of matrimonial 
property agreements, spouses might be described as ‘vulnerable’ or ‘dependents’ when 
entering into an agreement if they do not fully understand or realise the consequences of it. 
Such ‘vulnerability’ can come from an imbalance between the parties in respect of their age, 
gender, maturity, intellectual understanding, social status, education, and/or financial 
means,
68
 which means that the parties do not have an equal bargaining position.
 
A spouse can 
also be ‘vulnerable’ at the time of the divorce, as disparity in economic and social wellbeing 
can lead to such vulnerability.
69
 Divorce can create inequality between spouses and can have 
important consequences for the standard of living of one of them. The ‘economically 
vulnerable’ spouse would require the protection of a judge, as autonomy appears to reinforce 
their vulnerability.
70
 Today, the extensive powers given to the judge by section 25 of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 ensure that ‘economically vulnerable’ spouses cannot, by a 
contract, renounce the protection they need.
 71
  
While on one hand, autonomy should not become ‘the very essence’ of the family justice 
system’,
72
 as it is essential to carefully consider safeguards to protect fundamental social 
values, on the other hand, we have to consider the growing importance of autonomy as a 
fundamental principle in the area of family law. Today, family justice encourages private 
settlements.
73
 A justification in favour of this evolution is that giving more options to 
individuals to control their ‘normative positions’, eg allowing individuals to create new 
obligations and powers for themselves, can contribute to their wellbeing.
74
 ‘The ruling idea 
behind the ideal of personal autonomy is that people should make their own lives’.
75
 Today’s 
couples perceive ‘marriage as a vehicle of personal fulfilment and self-realization rather than 
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a commitment for life-long sharing’.
76
 Additionally, in the context of matrimonial property 
agreements, autonomy can be seen as a means of achieving a level of certainty. Under the 
current rules, ‘parties are denied precisely the satisfaction of knowing where they stand and 
the resultant peace and security which they might reasonably consider a high priority’.
77
 This 
argument is especially convincing, as the approach adopted by the courts in the division of 
assets is ‘chaotic’.
78
 By concluding an agreement, parties can avoid being submitted to this 
disordered approach and can instead opt for certainty. As will be shown in the final section, 
there are various ways to achieve equal bargaining powers between spouses. If the parties 
were well-protected and well-informed at the time of the conclusion of their agreement, the 
agreement would certainly reflect their willingness to determine themselves what they 
consider as ‘fair’ in their particular situation. 
Regarding ‘autonomy of process’, as family law produces some public consequences, ‘the 
justice of fairness in financial orders must be measured against social values including non-
discrimination and equality’.
79
 The recent ‘fight over same-sex marriage has intensified the 
idea that marriage is fundamental to the social order, a permanent commitment of the utmost 
importance, permeated by unshrinkable obligation and public normativity’.
80
 Some argue that 
the recognition of autonomy would undermine the concept of marriage as an institution; 
property division upon divorce is a manifestation of the marital obligation of mutual support 
and, as such, cannot be defined by the parties.
81
 One of the main differences between 
marriage and cohabitation is that marriage involves a mutuality of support between the 
spouses initially based on a voluntary choice (the spouses’ choice to enter into the marriage) 
but then recognised as a binding commitment by the state. Allowing spouses to negotiate this 
mutual support would deny the specificity of marriage. It would also encourage agreements 
‘that fall outside the guiding principle established by the law (…) and may serve to benefit 
only the strong at the expense of the weak’.
82
 However, the fact that courts erected the 
traditional solutions upon divorce having in mind a ‘traditional gender binary’ model, ie a 
‘systematic imbalance’ between the husband (‘money-earner’) and the wife (‘non-money 
earner’) undermines this argument. The recognition of the individuals’ preferred choice may 
prove more ‘egalitarian’ than the current solutions based on stereotypes.
83
 ‘The changes in 
the institution of marriage do not mean that vulnerability, dependence, clouded cognition, and 
unequal bargaining power have disappeared from the world of marital contracting. Still, 
                                                             
76
 A Cherlin, The Marriage-Go-Round: The State of Marriage and the Family in America Today 
(Vintage Books, 2010), 114-115. 
77
 S Cretney, ‘From Status to Contract?’ in F Rose (ed) Consensus ad Idem: essays in the Law of 
Contract in Honour of Guenter Treitel (Sweet & Maxwell, 1996), 281. 
78
 C Bendall, ‘Some are more “equal” than others: heteronormativity in the post-White era of financial 
remedies’ (2014) 36 JSWFL 260. 
79
 Diduck, n 63 above. 
80
 J Halley, ‘Behind the law of marriage (I): From Status/Contract to the marriage system’ (2010) 
Unbound, Vol 6:1. 
81
 George et al, n 41 above. 
82
 Diduck, n 63 above, 144. 
83
 Bendall, n 78 above. 
12 
 
socioeconomic shifts between men and women and the emergence of same-sex marriage 
invite us to rethink traditional limits placed on the contractual autonomy of spouses’.
84
 Our 
current society is ‘pluralistic’ and, as such, is governed by a growing acceptance of different 
lifestyles and religious or ideological views. The perception is that intimate relationships 
belong to the private sphere and, therefore, more freedom for parties within their marriage 
should be acknowledged.
85
 In addition, matrimonial property agreements can discourage 
future spouses from marrying or divorcing for the ‘wrong reasons’ (ie in the hope of 
obtaining a share of the wealthier party’s fortune). As such, they promote the institution of 
marriage. ‘If promoting marriage is a public objective, permitting flexibility in the meaning 
of marriage would seem more likely to attract people to the institution rather than adhering to 
fixed and immutable status’.
86
  
Thus, this paper argues that the duty to maintain what was created by marriage,
87
 which 
justifies the liability of one of the spouses to continue to support the other upon divorce, 
should be defined in a narrower way in the presence of a matrimonial property agreement. A 
specific definition of ‘needs’ should be used, reflecting the parties’ autonomy.  
The Law Commission Report recommends that ‘needs’ are ‘needs as understood in the 
general law’
88
 but the understanding of this concept varies and the extent of a needs-based 
provision is not clearly defined. While ‘needs’ most commonly takes into account all the 
circumstances of a particular case, especially the lifestyle enjoyed by the spouses during their 
marriage,
89
 needs have sometimes been ‘generously interpreted’
90
 or, in reverse, defined in a 
narrower way. According to the ‘generous’ interpretation, ‘needs’ adjust the parties’ 
respective resources as a result of the choices made during the marriage, while the ‘less 
generous’ interpretation refers to a ‘predicament of real needs’,
 91 
which ‘merely seems to be 
one that did not leave the claimant in a state of destitution’.
92
 Therefore, it is not clear if the 
mere function of needs is simply ensuring that the spouse will not be maintained by the State, 
or if needs have to be more ‘generously assessed’.
93
 For instance, in the recent newsworthy 
case of Estrada Jaffali v Jaffali, the High Court awarded an annual budget of £2.5 million to 
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the ex-wife of a billionaire. The Court took into account the marital standard of living to 
assess her future needs.
94
  
The Law Commission itself has underlined the difficulties related to the concept of ‘needs’, 
especially in respect of geographical inconsistency and the lack of transparency.
95
 Under its 
recommendation,
96
 the Family Justice Council
97
 prepared guidance as to the meaning of 
financial needs. On ‘needs-based cases’, the Family Justice Council encourages the courts to 
enable a transition to independence for the ex-spouses by departing from equal sharing.
98
 
When sufficient financial resources are available, needs would be subsumed within the equal 
sharing principle as ‘it may be fair (and so appropriate) for the court to sanction a 
continuation of ‘the lifestyle choices’ made during the marriage’.
99
 However, it is regrettable 
that the Family Justice Council does not propose any specific definition of ‘needs’ in the 
presence of a matrimonial property agreement. ‘When spouses contract themselves to alter 
the law that would otherwise apply, the enforceability of their contract should be governed 
(…) by a clear legal framework reflecting realistic policy choice’.
100
 This should require a 
clearer definition of ‘needs’. 
Despite the silence of the Law Commission and the Family Justice Council, some cases have 
given a specific definition of needs in the context of matrimonial property agreements, such 
as Radmacher, referring to ‘predicament of real needs’.
101
 Similarly, according to Limata v 
Luckwell,
102
 a matrimonial property agreement may affect ‘the size and the structure of any 
award’ (…), as ‘an agreement is capable of altering what is fair, including in relation to 
“need”’
103
. The presence of an agreement in itself has an impact on the definition of ‘needs’. 
This solution is welcomed as it can be argued that the presence of an agreement suggests that 
the spouses wished to conclude a contract that would limit interference by the courts. A clear 
definition of ‘needs’ in the context of matrimonial agreements also permits legal 
predictability, an aim which has been expressly pursued by the spouses.
104
 These solutions 
should be clearly confirmed by the legislator and the concept of ‘predicament of real needs’ 
could be explained further. Taking into account solutions that exist in another country can 
then be useful to show alternatives. 
The proposed legal model put forward in this paper is that of France, where the way to 
achieve fairness in the presence of a matrimonial agreement is different. In its Report, the 
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Law Commission engages with comparative experience but explains that any comparison 
‘has to be treated with caution’.
105
 Firstly, English law does not differentiate between income 
and capital, while such a difference does exist in France. Secondly, the Report reminds us 
that providing a home to the spouse is essential in England and Wales,
106
 when in France the 
housing needs can be covered by periodical or capital payments covering ongoing needs and 
renting of an adequate accommodation. 
It is important to keep in mind these differences between English and French law. They will 
have some consequences on considering safeguard against autonomy harming the vulnerable 
spouse. However, despite these differences, an analysis of the French system can lead to 
some new solutions. While French law upholds autonomy, it protects the vulnerable spouse 
by making a distinction between ‘the division of assets’ as decided by the parties where there 
is no possible interference of the judge, and ‘maintenance’ as decided by the judge, which 
offers a protection to the ‘vulnerable spouse’. 
Financial relief upon divorce and matrimonial property agreements in France 
French law treats the division of property and the issue of maintenance separately, in effect 
creating different ‘stages’ or ‘pillars’
107
 of the divorce process. Here, two of them are 
relevant. Firstly, the matrimonial regime is enforced; secondly, the judge evaluates the 
amount and the form of maintenance. When the divorce court has to wind up the matrimonial 
regime by applying the rules regulating this particular regime, the second stage of the divorce 
process, ie the possibility to claim for ‘financial relief’, might protect the vulnerable spouse. 
In France, a set of mandatory rules applies automatically to all married couples with the 
purpose of protecting their family life; it is called the ‘primary regime’. According to these 
imperative rules, the spouses cannot decide to organise maintenance in a matrimonial 
property agreement. Therefore, these agreements can only organise the administration of, and 
the entitlement to, the spouses’ assets during and after the marriage. 
When spouses do not opt for a specific matrimonial property regime, they are subject to a 
‘default regime’, the regime of ‘community of property’, or ‘community of acquests’.
108
 In 
this regime, the community consists of marital acquisitions (‘acquests’),
109
 meaning that all 
assets acquired during the marriage belong jointly to the spouses with the exception of assets 
received through gift or inheritance. In the event of a divorce, communal property is divided 
equally. The results achieved are similar to those obtained in English law, where the concept 
of equal sharing has become the starting point for financial settlements in divorce since White 
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v White.
110
 Some academics even consider that English law has moved towards the 
establishment of a kind of ‘community of property’ similar to that which exists in the rest of 
Europe.
111
 Therefore, in England and Wales, and in France, marriage is conceived as a 
partnership in which assets should be divided equally.
112
 
Despite these similarities, the perception of matrimonial agreements differs in these two 
systems for two reasons. First, in France, agreements are often a method by which a spouse 
can give property to the other spouse, rather than as a means to deprive them of such 
property. Second, in the French default system, gifts and inheritance are outside the sharing 
pool. The only way for spouses to share these kinds of assets will be to opt for a ‘regime of 
full community’. Therefore, in France, the spouses will have to voluntarily decide to expand 
the sharing pool, whereas in England and Wales, the distinction between the various 
categories of assets is not clear, which means that the judge can include gifts and inheritance 
into the sharing pool.  
Whilst French matrimonial property agreements do play a key role when a divorce occurs, 
one of the main distinctions between the French and English systems is that the powers of 
French judges are much more limited compared to those of their English counterparts.
113
 
Therefore, in England and Wales, there is a strict limit to the concept of autonomy in order 
not to call into question the discretionary powers of judges, while in France, greater latitude 
is given to the spouses. It is crucial to understand these differences before exploring how the 
approach of French law can lead to advocating new alternatives in England and Wales.  
In France, parties can conclude their own contrat de mariage. As some significant differences 
in the bargaining powers of the parties can exist when they enter into the agreement—one 
may be wealthier or the other easily influenced
114
—and as both spouses may marry for love 
and be naïve about their future, their protection requires some formalities. The notary draws 
up the agreement in a notarial deed, both in the presence and with the simultaneous consent 
of the spouses.
115
 The notary must provide the spouses with independent advice and be 
satisfied that said spouses understand the nature and consequences of their agreement and 
freely consent to it. Failure to do so can result in professional liability.
116
 If the spouses 
decide to sign an agreement, they have a considerable degree of freedom. They can choose 
from among a wide range of ‘conventional matrimonial regimes’ proposed by the statutes, or 
they can create a ‘tailor-made’ matrimonial regime. The process of electing one particular 
conventional matrimonial regime is discussed by the parties with the notary and will depend 
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on the specific circumstances of their case, eg the disparity between their assets and/or 
income, their professional situation, any previous marriage, any child from a former union, 
potential inheritance, or age.
117
 Should the marriage end, the rules of the chosen matrimonial 
regime will govern the allocation of assets; this is called ‘the liquidation of the matrimonial 
regime’.  
Among all of the conventional matrimonial regimes existing in France, one is particularly 
relevant for the purposes of this paper: the ‘separation of property regime’.
 118
 Under this 
regime, assets owned before the marriage, acquired during the marriage, or obtained by gift 
or inheritance, belong to the spouse who has acquired them. This spouse is the sole owner. 
This means that when a divorce occurs, the other spouse has no right to, or a share in, these 
assets. This can lead to cases where, for example, the husband retains his wealth and the wife 
is left with little means, as there are no matrimonial assets to share between them.
119
 It does 
not mean that fairness is ignored, however, but whilst fairness is in England and Wales is 
seen to require discretionary powers of the judge, in France it is mainly obtained via a set of 
fixed rules, thus fairness seems to equate to certainty and to compliance with the pre-nuptial 
wishes of the parties.  
A 2013 study revealed that young French couples are increasingly opting for this regime. In 
2012, 10 percent of all the couples married did so under a separation of property agreement 
versus only 6.1 percent in 1992. The study concluded that young couples are more 
independent than they used to be. Some may want to marry but also wish to keep their 
financial independence; for them, marriage is not necessarily about the sharing of assets and 
money. The study gives various reasons for this desire of independence. First, because of the 
increase in divorces, young people are more likely to consider the short-term consequences of 
marriage and are therefore less likely to opt for a ‘community of property’. Second, women 
are more independent today than they were in the past. Third, people get married at a later 
age; the spouses might already have an important estate when entering into marriage that they 
do not always want to share with their future husband or wife.
120
 
The French separation of property regime is very similar to that in England and Wales when a 
matrimonial property agreement is signed, as it is in this very specific situation that one of the 
spouses can be in a disadvantaged position if a divorce occurs. However, the ‘vulnerable’ 
spouse will be protected by ‘maintenance’. 
Similarly to English law, French law imposes a duty to maintain on marriage. Divorce puts 
an end to this duty but one of the spouses may be compelled to pay the other a financial 
remedy; ‘maintenance’ could therefore protect the vulnerable spouse. As explained before, a 
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‘primary regime’ is automatically applied to all married couples. This regime aims to achieve 
fairness.
121
 It especially prohibits agreements on maintenance when they are concluded prior 
to any divorce proceedings,
122
 as parties cannot assess what could constitute the necessary 
financial support between them upon a divorce, as external circumstances are sometimes 
unforeseeable.
123
 Maintenance agreements prior to divorce are against public policy and good 
morals,
124
 as, upon divorce, spouses are protected by the possibility to claim for a 
‘compensatory benefit’. This leads to a distinction between two steps in divorce.  
The first step, the allocation of the various assets held between the two spouses, is governed 
by the rules of the ‘matrimonial regime’. The enforcement of the matrimonial property 
agreement occurs regardless of the regime chosen by the parties. The judge cannot amend or 
set aside the agreement because of a change in circumstances or on the ground of unfairness. 
However, the agreement cannot include any provision in relation to maintenance. 
Once a matrimonial regime has been wound up, one of the parties can ask the judge to 
examine the question of ‘maintenance’; this is the second step. In France, maintenance takes 
the form of a prestation compensatoire (which can be translated as ‘compensatory benefit’ 
even if neither the French name nor the English translation truly reflect its nature). It intends 
‘to compensate, as far as possible, for any disparity that the breakdown of the marriage 
creates in the respective ways of living’.
125
 However, the judge’s discretionary power is 
limited in its scope. The judge cannot interfere in the distribution of assets, which will be 
carried out in accordance with the rules of the matrimonial property agreement.  
The judge must determine the level of maintenance according to the needs of the spouse to 
whom it is paid and to the means of the paying spouse, with particular regard to the duration 
of the marriage, the ages and states of health of the spouses, their professional qualifications 
and occupations, the consequences of employment choices made by one spouse for the 
duration of their relationship in respect of raising their children, or for favouring their 
spouse's career, the estimated or foreseeable level of their assets.
126
 Most of these criteria are 
similar to those considered by English judges under section 25(2) of the 1973 Act. French 
law perceives maintenance as a way of avoiding hardship and to provide cover for ongoing 
needs, including the costs of accommodation. It also takes into account a compensatory 
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component and reflects the contribution and sacrifice of the spouse, making the French rules 
close to the solution raised in Radmacher.
127
  
Despite the absence of any compulsory formula, French lawyers and judges have developed 
calculation methods to provide as much certainty as possible for the parties even if, in 
practice, the amount of maintenance obtained by the ex-spouse may differ from one judge to 
another.
128
 Today, there are some discussions related to the possible introduction of a formula 
as a form of non-statutory guidance.
129
 As such, a working group of practitioners have 
created a new online tool, ‘PilotePC’, which aims to help solicitors and judges to fix the 
awards.
130
 The formula takes into account the disparity between the predictable monthly 
incomes of both ex-spouses, as well as the duration of their marriage and their pension rights. 
This proposition presents some similarities with the reflection in England and Wales on the 
introduction of a ‘standard model’ for calculating financial relief in divorce.
131
 Despite the 
long tradition of judicial discretion, the Law Commission considers that the development of 
non-statutory guidelines will contribute to make more ‘transparent’ the solutions in spousal 
support.
132
 It will also allow people to have access to online calculators that would indicate an 
estimated award. A working group
133
 is currently examining these possibilities. In both 
countries, the use of non-statutory formula could lead to more certainty. However, keeping a 
reasonable level of discretion for the judge is desirable. The French concept of maintenance 
is flexible enough to reflect the particular circumstances of a case and to protect the most 
disadvantaged spouse. Therefore, any future formula should only be used as guidance for the 
judge and not to be applied automatically.  
Despite the similarities of the criteria used in French and English laws to evaluate financial 
relief, a crucial difference between the two systems is that in France, maintenance cannot 
correct the results produced by the separation of property regime. When deciding the amount 
of compensatory benefit, the French judge cannot consider the ‘unfairness’ caused by the 
matrimonial property agreement and be more generous with the ‘vulnerable party’ when the 
spouses have opted for a separation of property agreement than when they have opted for a 
community regime. In several cases, the Cour de Cassation
134
 held that compensatory 
benefits should not reverse the rules of the separation of the property regime; judges must not 
indirectly undermine the provisions of this agreement by allocating a significant 
compensatory benefit. Separation of property reveals a desire of financial independence, and 
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as such, awards that would call into question this independence are not conceivable. The 
spouses’ autonomy is thus protected.  
As such, despite the ‘compensatory’ component of the compensatory benefit, French law 
defines ‘maintenance’ less generously than English law in ‘big money’ cases where a 
separation of property agreement exists. For instance, in one such French case where there 
was a long lasting marriage, the Court of Appeal of Douai awarded a compensatory benefit of 
2,000,000 euros to the wife against the husband’s assets of approximately 14,000,000 
euros.
135
 However, the Cour de Cassation reversed this decision as the compensatory benefit 
should not correct the consequences caused by the rules of the separation of the property 
regime.
136
 Judges are not supposed to correct ‘in equity’ the results produced by an 
agreement freely chosen by the spouses.
137
 The parties had chosen to keep their assets 
separate, therefore the judge had to respect this agreement and evaluate the ‘maintenance’ of 
the ‘vulnerable spouse’ accordingly. The compensatory benefit certainly covered the basic 
needs and the disparity created by the marriage’s breakdown, but it did not necessarily 
promote an ‘equitable’ distribution. The disparity was appreciated in relation to the ongoing 
needs of the ‘vulnerable spouse’ but did not require that the paying spouse had to transfer a 
substantial part of his or her assets. While capital acquired during marriage is divided equally 
in a community regime; this is not the case in a separation regime. Here, the presence of a 
matrimonial property agreement had a restrictive financial aspect.  
Similarly, in a case where the parties were married for six years but only cohabited for 
eighteen months, the Court of Appeal of Versailles rejected the wife’s claim for a 
compensatory benefit, notwithstanding the disparity between the spouses’ assets.
138
 The 
Court held that ‘[the wife] does not prove any disparity created by the divorce…, moreover 
the spouses have expressed their willingness to separate their assets and to assume their 
independence by opting for a separation of property regime’ (emphasis added).
139
 There was 
nothing to compensate and thus the Court rejected the claim. The solution differs from the 
Law Commission’s Report, as the Report does not propose a specific definition of ‘needs’ in 
the presence of a matrimonial property agreement. The English concept of ‘needs’ appears as 
a statement of practical, material reality. However, this assessment will be incomplete if the 
existence of a matrimonial property agreement is not fully taken into account when assessing 
the needs. The definition of ‘needs’ would have to be different when the parties have signed 
an agreement to reflect the parties’ views. Evaluating the ‘needs’ identically in all cases, 
without taking into account the existence of the matrimonial property agreement interferes 
with their wishes.  
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It is possible to make a comparison with succession law, an area that considers the wishes of 
the individual. When the deceased dies intestate, the law will distribute the estate according 
to fixed rules under the Administration of Estates Act 1925. However, when the deceased 
leaves a valid will, the law will recognise the importance of the deceased’s wishes and 
therefore of the individual’s autonomy. In presence of a will, the law still protects the basic 
needs of certain qualified relatives. However, the financial provision they might receive via 
the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act 1975 will not be the same as the 
share they would have benefited from if the deceased had died intestate. This demonstrates 
that autonomy can have an influence on ‘fairness’. In the absence of an expression of wishes, 
it is for the law to define what ‘fairness’ is. However, when individuals have clearly 
expressed their wishes (via a will or a matrimonial property agreement), it can be argued that 
‘fairness’ is required to take these wishes into account. ‘Fairness’ implies ‘freedom to 
contract out of the terms of the standard form’
140
 and therefore to set up a specific definition 
of ‘needs’ in the presence of a matrimonial property agreement. 
Of course, an explanation for the discrepancy between the French and the English system is 
that there are differences between the social and economic backgrounds of these two 
countries. As such, when looking at the female labour market participation, one can notice 
that in France, childcare is much more affordable than in England and Wales, where full-time 
childcare facilities are not broadly available and where childcare costs can be a further 
disincentive for mothers to start or return to work.
141
 In addition, providing a home for the ex-
spouse is crucial in England and Wales. Consequently, it is not possible to calculate ‘needs’ 
similarly in both countries, as the costs of accommodation or rehousing are different and as  
couples will more frequently own their property in England and Wales than in France, where 
the rental market is more developed. However, despite these nuances, the core difference 
between the two systems comes from their distinctive approaches. English law, mainly based 
on the discretionary power of the judge, can learn from systems such as French law, where 
financial relief is based on fixed rules that emphasise certainty.  
The main difference between the compared systems is that France winds up a matrimonial 
regime according to its own provisions with no possible intervention by the judge. 
‘Maintenance’ does not permit, in itself, a redistribution of assets by the judge; thus, the 
existence of a matrimonial property agreement limits the amount of money awarded to the 
ex-spouse. In contrast, if England and Wales choose to adopt the Law Commission Report’s 
recommendation, the judge would be able to wholly disregard the matrimonial agreement, or 
to reduce its weight, when considering the issue of ‘financial needs’. 
Protecting the vulnerable spouse by formal requirements and by opting for a pillar 
approach 
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This section considers the Law Commission’s aim of protecting the disadvantaged spouse. It 
praises the safeguard offering protection to the parties at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract but expresses concerns about the use of needs as a limit to the parties’ autonomy.   
The first proposition of the Law Commission is to protect parties at the time of the conclusion 
of the agreement. For a matrimonial property agreement to be binding, each spouse must be 
able to make an autonomous decision.
 
The Law Commission’s Report equally recommends 
introducing an obligation for each spouse to receive legal advice when entering into a 
matrimonial property agreement. 
The results of an empirical research undertaken in New York found that the disparity of the 
spouses’ reciprocal wealth could create an ‘unequal bargaining power’.
 142
 When the study 
found that independent legal advice does not always remedy this problem,
 143
 legal advice 
prior to marriage could, however, help future spouses realise when they are going to enter 
into a ‘bad deal’. A professional and independent lawyer would be able to warn the parties of 
the potential changes in financial circumstances that could happen during their marriage, 
especially on gender lines. As such, the professional would emphasise the risk for the female 
spouse to end up disadvantaged if she decided to stop her career to look after the couple’s 
children for instance. As Lady Hale recommended, it is necessary to verify whether ‘each 
party freely enter[ed] into an agreement, intending it to have legal effect and with a full 
appreciation of its implications’.
144
 
As recommended by the Law Commission, various formal requirements could be used to 
ensure that each party is able to make an ‘autonomous decision’. Spouses could disclose their 
assets and debts prior to the conclusion of an agreement and use the services of a notary.
145
 
As explained in section 3, in France, the protection of the spouses is achieved partly via such 
mechanisms. This should guarantee that free, voluntary, and informed consent is given by 
each of the spouses, especially as the legal advisor would be duty bound to inform the client 
of their legal position and the effect and wisdom of making such an agreement. Likewise, 
each spouse would be given the opportunity to speak to their lawyer to receive information 
separately from their intended spouse. Separate counselling should increase protection, as it 
would reduce the risk of influence exercised upon the weaker party by the more powerful 
one.
146
 In this aspect, the Law Commission’s recommendation seems even more protective 
than the provision under French law.  
Legal counselling increases the prospect of an agreement being fully understood. This is 
especially important when one of the spouses has no legal knowledge or is not fluent in the 
language used for the agreement. It prevents hasty decisions and emphasises the importance 
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of the agreement. All of these formalities increase the likelihood that the future spouses are 
informed of the potential risks arising from a change in circumstances.
147
 Such formalities 
also have some evidentiary purposes. By providing the parties with a clear and certain 
solution, they reduce the risk of litigation.  
The Law Commission also recommended that a matrimonial property agreement should not 
be ‘qualifying’ unless it is a valid contract.
148
 This means that the agreement may be void or 
voidable for mistake, duress, or because of undue influence,
149
 and may even be frustrated if 
circumstances change dramatically. Between endorsing a ‘construct of marriage as an 
immutable status’ and placing ‘marital contracts almost on a par with commercial contracts’, 
‘a consensus exists that the law should impose an obligation of honesty, good faith, and fair 
dealing on spouses when entering into a marital contract’.
150
 These recommendations are 
certainly essential as they provide safeguards for the parties at the time of the conclusion of 
the contract as well as in case of unforeseen circumstances. 
The second necessary form of safeguards aims to protect the ‘vulnerable’ party at the time of 
the divorce by considering the results produced by the matrimonial property agreement. In 
the system proposed by the Law Commission, the judge may easily override the agreement as 
the procedure relies on a vague concept: the ‘needs’ of the spouse. There ‘would be a 
considerable incentive [placed] upon the parties to provide generously for needs rather than 
risk litigation’
151
 and the Law Commission’s proposals would, therefore, construct 
‘something very like a deferred community of acquests [ie a community of property]’.
152
 The 
principle of sharing the assets, either by allocating generous needs or by creating a 
‘community of property’, will then still exist. As there is not a clear distinction between the 
distribution of property and financial relief, and because of the risk that ‘needs’ would be 
assessed ‘generously’, it would still be impossible to conclude a ‘separation of property’ 
agreement. If based on lessons learned from the French approach, the protection of the spouse 
could be achieved without altering the autonomy of the spouses in this way. In France, 
regardless of the regime chosen by the spouses, the discretion of the judge is more limited 
than in England and Wales. However, maintenance cannot be included in the contract and can 
then be seen as ‘an expression of fairness’
153
 because it is related to the duty to support each 
other created by marriage.  
This is a welcome safety net as, while autonomy’s recognition is important, it is necessary to 
ensure that marriage would still be an important channel of protection for the spouse in need. 
Without this minimal protection, the spousal duty to maintain will simply disappear. 
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Marriage is both a public and a private union
154
 and as such, ‘the conflicting issues of 
autonomy and vulnerability apply to divorce settlement across two separate dimensions – the 
relationship of the parties with the state, and their relationship with each other’.
155
 Therefore, 
despite the growing autonomy within marriage, ‘there is an irreducible minimum. This 
includes a couple's mutual duty to support one another and their children’.
156
 In addition, the 
possibility for a spouse to walk away and leave his partner with nothing will increase 
pressure on social security to take care of the vulnerable spouse.
157
 ‘The potential legal duty 
to support a former spouse becomes an inherent and immutable feature of the marital 
relationship’.
158
  
England and Wales show signs of heading in the direction of a ‘pillarised’ system’ in 
international cases.
159
 This paper argues that England and Wales should go even further by 
adopting a two-pillar approach systemically,
 
ie in pure English cases, as this would protect 
the principle of autonomy while ensuring protection for the disadvantaged spouse at the same 
time. In order to provide a specific definition of ‘fairness’ when a matrimonial property 
agreement has been concluded, a distinction between property rights and ‘needs provisions’ 
or ‘maintenance’ should be made.  
Radmacher was the first ‘international’ case to adopt a ‘pillarised’ approach by ‘permitting 
contracting-out of [the] equal sharing [of assets], but preserving liability for (some level of) 
needs/compensation-based provision to separate “sharing of assets” and “needs 
provisions”’.
160
 Later, Z v Z (no 2)
161
 accepted the exclusion of sharing due to the French 
matrimonial property agreement signed by the parties and pronounced an order based on 
needs only. In this case, two French citizens concluded a separation of property agreement in 
France, which excluded any right to share personal assets and assets acquired during the 
marriage. However, there was no mention of maintenance in the matrimonial property 
agreement in accordance with the rules of the French primary regime. At the time of the 
divorce, the couple were living in London. They had three children and the assets involved 
were worth £15 million, most of them belonging to the husband, whose income was 
extremely high. Moor J held that English law was applicable; he upheld the agreement but 
made provision for the wife’s needs. In total, she received 40 percent of the assets (£6 
million). If the couple had divorced in France, the amount of provision for the wife would 
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have probably been lower (between £2.25 million and £4.8 million
162
) but, as explained 
before, the cost of living is higher in England and Wales than in France. What is important 
here is that Moor J reasoned as a French judge would have done by applying first the terms of 
the agreement, and then by calculating the amount of maintenance.  
More recently, in SA v PA (Pre-Marital Agreement: Compensation), there was another case 
with a foreign component in which Mostyn J followed a similar ‘pillar’ approach.
163
 A Dutch 
man and an English woman had signed a Dutch pre-marital agreement, which addressed ‘how 
existing capital might be shared, but left the question of maintenance entirely at large’.
164
 As 
a first step, Mostyn J implemented the capital provisions and followed the content of the 
agreement. Then, as a second step, he considered the wife’s needs under section 25. In this 
case, there seems to have been a clear distinction between property division and maintenance. 
Property division (with specific rules applying for the matrimonial home) was made in 
accordance with the agreement, and the wife’s needs were then considered separately.
165
 This 
solution was the result of the choice made by the parties, who decided to limit the content of 
their agreement to the sharing of their capital and to exclude the issue of maintenance from it.  
Adopting a ‘pillar approach’ would be a way to allow couples to sign any kind of property 
matrimonial agreement, the only limit being the possibility to claim for ‘maintenance 
provision’. When defining the concept of needs in the near future, English legislation should 
consider adopting a genuine pillar approach in order to clarify the concept of needs and the 
role played by the judge. As previously explained, ‘needs’ should be defined differently 
depending on whether or not a matrimonial agreement has been signed. An alternative to the 
current proposals would be to use two different concepts: ‘needs’ in the absence of any 
matrimonial property agreement, and ‘maintenance’ when an agreement has been signed. 
Using two different concepts would reflect the importance of matrimonial property 
agreements. In the presence of such an agreement, the judge would not apply the vague 
concept of ‘needs’—which can be defined in an extremely generous way in some cases—but 
a more clearly-defined concept: ‘maintenance’. The concept of ‘maintenance’ would allow 
the spouses to conclude a separation of property agreement without any interference from the 
court in the property distribution. This would provide a new answer to the criticisms of the 
current solutions. 
The definition of ‘maintenance’ in each country takes into account the socio-economic 
factors of the particular country.
 
In England and Wales, it is especially important not to leave 
the other party reliant on state benefits, and capital-provision for housing is crucial.
166
 
Therefore, the notion of ‘maintenance’ would be defined in accordance with the criteria 
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already used in other areas of English family law. As such, it is helpful to consider the 
definition of maintenance in the context of the Inheritance (Provision for Family and 
Dependents) Act 1975, which permits some relatives of the deceased to claim, upon certain 
conditions, a provision necessary for their maintenance. In its 2014 Report, the Law 
Commission made a connection between ‘financial needs’ in the matrimonial context and the 
‘maintenance’ standard in the 1975 Act, but rejected the link ‘because there are so few claims 
by former spouses under the 1975 Act, and [therefore] it is not really clear what maintenance 
means for such claims’.
167
 However, it might be possible to refer to the ‘maintenance 
standard’ used in claims introduced, not by the former spouse but by other relatives (for 
instance, children of the deceased).  
When considering case law related to the ‘the maintenance standard’ in relation to claims 
made by other dependents, it appears that this standard could be used as a safety net to 
prevent financial hardship and to ensure that one spouse will not be left dependent upon the 
state for financial support. For instance, in Re Coventry, maintenance was described on the 
one hand as ‘not just enough to enable a person to get by [but] on the other hand, it does not 
mean anything which may be regarded as reasonably desirable for [the claimant’s] general 
benefit or welfare’.
168
 Additionally Re Dennis states that ‘maintenance’ connotes only 
payments which (…) enable the applicant in the future to discharge the cost of his daily living 
at whatever standard of living is appropriate to him’.
169
 More recently, in Ilott v Mitson,
170
 the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed that the concept of maintenance ‘cannot extend to any or 
everything which it would be desirable for the claimant to have. It must import provision to 
meet the everyday expenses of living’.
171
  
The notion of ‘maintenance’ would be less generous than the current concept of ‘needs’ but 
would include ongoing basic needs and reallocation of property. The consequences of this 
solution would be explained to the parties by a professional legal adviser at the time their 
agreement is concluded, offering the possibility for the parties to opt for a broader definition 
of ‘needs’. Greater certainty will thus be achieved concerning the quantum and duration of 
the spousal support. This would certainly be welcomed in England and Wales at a time where 
the reduction of budgets for family justice and legal aid can make access to a lawyer difficult. 
Predictable outcomes are even more economically important than before and can be reached 
by adopting a clear distinction between maintenance and property distribution.
172
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Conclusion 
In the context of financial settlements after divorce, fairness could be described as a balance 
between guaranteeing the autonomy of the parties and providing the disadvantaged spouse 
with the required resources. In France, as in England and Wales, the protection of the 
disadvantaged spouse is essential in family law. As in English law, French law considers the 
contributions of the homemaker and monetary contributor as equal, and the legal regime of 
community is based on the sharing of assets acquired during marriage. However, the 
safeguards that exist in both countries to protect the disadvantaged spouse, and the place 
given to autonomy, are different. While English law provides the balance by allocating 
important discretionary powers to the judge, French law provides a framework for the 
spouses’ willingness at the time of the agreement’s conclusion. The latter offers more 
security to the spouses than the former, and as such, might be considered as offering 
interesting solutions for the coming discussions related to the concept of ‘needs’.  
The way in which the law currently makes use of the concept of fairness does not offer 
sufficient protection to the autonomy of the spouses, as matrimonial property agreements can 
be set aside by the court. Safeguards to protect the disadvantaged spouse are necessary, but 
they should be strictly defined in order to leave more room for the spouses’ autonomy. Thus, 
fairness cannot be defined in the same way whether there is a matrimonial property 
agreement or not; the agreement has an impact on the definition of ‘fairness’. A new 
suggestion is to reconsider the balance between autonomy and protection by creating specific 
safeguards inspired by French law. Using ‘maintenance’ instead of ‘needs’ would offer more 
clarity and security for spouses, and by establishing a distinction between the distribution of 
assets and maintenance, the powers of the judge would be more limited, enabling greater 
possibility for parties to decide freely the distribution of their assets. These propositions 
might offer the spouses better guarantees and increase the certainty that their agreement 
would not be amended by the court.  
 
